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DOCKBSPWOU GARZA, I1 
Defendant 
v s . 
STATE 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
I. Whether the Court erred in denying defendant's motion to 
suppress the evidence seized at the stop of the automobile in 
which defendant was a passenger, as well as the evidence seized 
at defendant's home? 
II. Whether defendant had the requisite intent, in accordance 
with Utah Code Ann. Section 58-37a-3, to make the possession of 
the subject lab equipment violative of said criminal statute? 
III. Whether the State's subsequent search of defendant's home 
was violative of defendant's Constitutional rights against 
unreasonable search and seizure and her fundamental right of 
privacy under the Fourth and Ninth Amendments of the Bill of 
Rights? 
IV. Whether the Pre-sentencing Report was unduly prejudicial 
and, thus, violated defendant's Fourteenth Amendment right of due 
process? 
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DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
AMENDMENT IV 
[Unreasonable searches and seizures.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
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Leonard was speeding at 70 miles per hour in a 55 miles per hour 
zone. Further, Fox, who had observed appellant and Leonard at 
Intertech Chemical, stated that he believed they were purchasing 
these items for illicit purposes. Another police officer, 
officer Caldwell, stated that appellant and Leonard allegedly hid 
the equipment in the back of the truck, that they did not own the 
truck in which they were transporting the equipment and that they 
did not given their names when they purchased said equipment. 
The State claims these allegations constitute probable cause. 
Upon said stop, appellant and Leonard were arrested for 
possession of drug paraphernalia. 
In the evening of July 20, 1989, a search warrant was issued 
for appellant's place of residence. Found and seized by the 
police at her residence, where Leonard lived as well, were 
glassware, chemicals and paperwork the police believed indicated 
participation in the manufacture of controlled substance. 
On August 17, 1989, appellant filed a motion to suppress the 
evidence obtained by police incident to the stop of the vehicle 
and search of appellant's residence. On October 19, 1989, Judge 
George Ballif denied appellant's motion to suppress evidence. 
Appellant was sentenced on July 20, 1990, following a plea 
of guilty to two third degree felony charges subject to her right 
to appeal the district court's ruling denying the motion to 
suppress evidence. The judgment of the district court was an 
imposition of the statutory sentence to the Utah State Prison. 
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ARGUMENT 
THE EVIDENCE SEIZED AS A RESULT OF THE UNREASONABLE SEARCH 
AND SEIZURE OF THE AUTOMOBILE APPELLANT WAS RIDING IN 
I S TAINTED AS FRUIT OF THE POISONOUS TREE AND, 
THEREFORE, INADMISSIBLE. 
I n o r d e r f o r t h e s t o p p i n g o f a n a u t o m o b i l e b y a p o l i c e 
o f f i c e * ! " t h e e v i d e n c e o b t a i n e d t h e r e b y , i i be u p h o l d r\t MMjtjL 
a n d a< liii i i"*n i 111 *> i i I il< I i I«<-IL*<>I
 VJI ' <
jiiet-i- , m ' t 
v a q n e u n s u l i b l a n t i i i I ». iLipIcxoi ib v o i c e d by t h e o f f i c e i , S t a t e v . 
Ream, 505 1', 2d 56 9 ( A I J Z 1 £l .' 11 In t hi i n s t a n t c a s e , 1 he 
a u t o m o b i l e * a p p e l l a n t wa.s I iMin | IIIIIIIII wa1 iufipt i n, i i i 11 ei IM I H I \r 
ipOLii n t c o n d u c t m q iiii i n v e s t i g a t i o n . However , If . U n i t e d 
S t a t e s S u p r e m e Cour t h a s h e l d t h n t t h e F o u r t h Amendment d o e s n o t 
permit motor vehicle stops by police to check for proper 
registration and license without any indication of criminal 
conduct. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 
889 (1968). 
The standard required for an officer of the law to stop a 
vehicle is that the officer must have a reasonable and 
articulable suspicion that a crime has been committed or is about 
to be committed. State v. Carter, 578 P.2d 790 (Or. 1978). In 
State v. Bonds, 577 P.2d 781 (Hi. 1978), the court held that 
evidence seen within an automobile and seized by a police officer 
after an investigative stop made without adequate cause was 
acquired by unreasonable seizure and was inadmissible. The court 
in Bonds further stated that a discretionary stop of an 
automobile by a police officer for the purpose of investigating 
possible violations of laws regulating the operation of a motor 
vehicle may be made only when there are specific and articulable 
fact which, when taken together with rational inferences from 
those facts, would warrant a man of reasonable caution to believe 
that criminal conduct is taking place and that the action taken 
is inappropriate. Absent reasonable suspicion, "any evidence 
derived from the stop is 'fruit of the poisonous tree", Wong Sun 
v. United States, 371 U.S. 347, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 
(1963)/ and must be excluded. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 
347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967). 
The Utah Court of Appeals has stated that "any time a police 
officer stops an automobile the stop necessarily involves 
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detention and therefore is an encounter requiring reasonable, 
_ ^ . -.... 6 
h App. 1988 t^e.JL- Talbotf -- : *.* «*. 7 
1990), Anpeals summar ze>: ^ecent 
• w i l l I I ' i" I ) II 11 i l l II I , I I,"1 S I 1 1 - 1 ( 1 II " 
xi.ouii iet nto three geneiai principles: 
First, a reasonable suspicion must be based upon 
objective facts which indicate the existence of 
criminal activity, Second, the officer must be able to 
articulate what it is about those facts which leads to 
an inference of criminal activity. If the officer is 
unable to articulate what facts and inferences led to 
his suspicion, the suspicion is classified as a mere 
hunch and will not justify the subsequent stop. 
Finally, the facts must be judged against an objective 
standard: would the facts available to the officer at 
the moment of the seizure or the search "warrant a 
person of reasonable caution in the belief" that the 
action taken was appropriate? Anything less would 
invite intrusions upon constitutionally guaranteed 
r i ght s based on noth i ng m~ ^ ~ subs tant ia1 than 
inarticulate hunches. 
I d l i| i i I M l i nn , 1 1 11IIin i II I i i II | . 
F u r t l i e i iiidiiy c o u r t n h n v r bold Hint i d i s c r e t i o n a r y s t o p t o 
c o n d u c t i n v e s t i g a t o r y f i e l d I n t e r r o g a t i o n c o n s t i t u t e s inn iiiri 1 awl u L 
1,1
 ii1 mi I III iiii I In iiiiiii'iiii I iii|| n l I In I i in i I  Ii Akiiiii iiiliiiii iiiill I'lt't1 . S t a t e 
v . P u i g , i i 1  IP ,'il 4 'I ( A n * 1'1 iM> | ; S e t 1 a l s o S t a t e v . B o n d s , r 7 7 
P . 2 d 7 8 1 ( H i . . 1 9 7 8 ) , Mi H > H I P p u r p o s e ml 1 h e " s t o p 1 WHM t o 
i n v e s t i g a t e I Ii ' i iml i i i I 11 II it|i|n l l i i n l m i l Li i nihil ill , In 1 *=-JLl iL i 
s u p r a t h e u j t i i t s t a t e d t h a t tliv " s e i z u r e " «il ri p e r s o n i s o n l y 
reasonable where a police officer observes unusual ronducl which 
:« : / l i r a fin r e a s o n a b l y i n n liinlf I h i | i r i HI i iiiuj I ,n ll i iui 1 \ ., hi 
a t o o i I I u l s o
 r D a v i s v . M i s s i s s i p p i , 3 Ii i U . S i J il , n9 y , l L . 
! 
1394, 22 L.Ed.2d 676 (1969).1 Thus, in the instant case, the 
officer did not have reason to conclude that appellant was 
involved in criminal activity. Appellant had merely purchased 
legal lab equipment at a public store. Therefore, the "stop" 
constituted an unreasonable seizure in violation of appellant's 
Fourth Amendment rights. Accordingly, the evidence obtained by 
the unreasonablbe seizure is tainted as fruit of the poisonous 
tree and should be suppressed. 
II. APPELLANT LACKED THE INTENT REQUIRED BY UTAH CODE ANN. 
SECTION 58-37a-3 TO MAKE HER ALLEGED POSSESSION 
OF THE SUBJECT EQUIPMENT VIOLATIVE OF 
THE CRIMINAL STATUTE. 
Utah Code Ann. Section 58-37a-3 defines drug paraphernalia 
as follows: 
'Drug Paraphernalia' means any equipment, product, or 
material used or intended for use, to plant, propagate, 
cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture, compound, 
convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, 
package, repackage, store, contain, conceal, inject, 
ingest, inhale, or to otherwise introduce a controlled 
substance into the human body in violation of Chapter 
37, Title 58 . . . . 
The intent defined in the above-statute must be established in 
appellant in order for appellant to be convicted of the alleged 
1
 In Davis, the Supreme Court of the United States stated: 
Investigatory seizures would subject unlimited numbers 
of innocent persons to the harassment and ignominy 
incident to involuntary detention. Nothing is more 
clear than that the Fourth Amendment was meant to 
prevent wholesale intrusions upon the personal security 
of our citizenry, whether these intrusions be termed 
'arrests' or 'investigatory detentions.' 
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crime. Furthermore, a conviction of possession of drug 
paraphernalia cannot be had on the basis of transferred intent or 
guilt by association. State v. Murphy, 674 P.2d 1220 (Utah 
1983). 
In Murphy, supra, the Supreme Court of Utah stated: "It has 
further been generally held that the exemplar items are not 
(drug) paraphernalia per se but only become so when coupled with 
the seller's intent that it be so used." Id. at 1223.2 Further, 
in Murphy, the Court delineated the following elements the State 
must prove before a valid conviction under U.C.A. Section 58-37a-
3 can be had: 
1. The objects were drug paraphernalia as defined by 
the statute (in other words, the defendant delivered 
the items intending that they be used for the 
production or consumption of controlled substances); 
2. The defendant delivered the items knowing that the 
buyer of the item would thereafter use them with 
controlled substances. 
In the instant case, the State did not prove that appellant knew 
or reasonably should have known that the subject equipment was 
going to be used with controlled substances. See Murphy, supra, 
at 1224. Therefore, it cannot be reasonably inferred that 
appellant had the requisite intent to make said possession 
criminal. 
2
 In Murphy, the court held that because the State presented 
no evidence as to what appellant knew or did not know concerning 
the sale in question, it was legally and factually impossible to 
infer intent on appellant's part. Thus, the court held that the 
evidence was insufficient to sustain conviction. 
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Absent the requisite intent making the mere possession of 
lab equipment a crime, it is improper for police officers to 
seize such equipment. Gumz v. Morrissette, 772 F.2d 1395 (7th 
Cir. 1985). In determining whether the intent does indeed exist, 
the court in Delaware Accessories Trad Ass'n v. Gebelein, 497 F. 
Supp. 289 (D.Del. 1980), said that "even the illicit dealer, 
however, is not held legally responsible. . . . for guessing what 
is in the mind of a buyer. The seller is safe as long as he does 
not actually know the buyer's purpose and as long as the 
objective facts that are there for him to observe do not give 
fair notice that illegal use will ensue." Likewise, in the 
instant case, to the knowledge of appellant thejy were purchasing 
the equipment for a person in Salt Lake City; the purpose for 
which the equipment was to be used was unknown, or uncertain at 
best as far as appellant was concerned. 
Moreover, in Murphy, supra, the court stated: 
Utah has modified the language of the Model Act so as 
to strictly require that a person know that the buyer 
will use the paraphernalia for illegal purposes. . . 
The few courts that have addressed that language have 
held that the language requires an cictual knowledge by 
the accused. 
Murphy, supra, at 1224; See also, Town Tobacconist v. Kimmelman, 
453 A.2d 209 (N.J. Super A.D. 1982). "Absent an admission from 
the purchaser as to his intent, neither a merchant nor a 
policeman would have objective criteria upon which to base a 
reasonable belief that an item purchased is to be used with 
controlled substances." Id. at 215. 
A case decided by the Nebraska Supreme Court is instructive 
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regarding intent. See, Leibrandt v. Lomax, 423 N.W.2d 453 (Neb. 
1988). In Leibrandt, the court decided that the defendant had 
not violated a statute making it a crime to be in the possession 
of burglar's tools where the police had stopped defendant's 
vehicle while traveling down a public highway nowhere in the 
vicinity of burglaries, and found a screwdriver in defendant's 
possession. The court stated its holding as follows: 
On the basis of this record it cannot be said that 
possession of an ordinary screwdriver, even if kept 
under the automobile seat, is such a fact as would 
warrant a person of reasonable caution to believer that 
the offense of possession of burglar's tools had been 
committed. (Cites omitted). Thus, the district court 
was not clearly in error in determining that what 
Osborne (the arresting officer) then saw was not such 
an item as to make it 'immediately apparent' to the 
officers that the items they observed were evidence of 
a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure. 
Id. at 452. 
In the instant case, officer Fox observed the items which 
are alleged drug paraphernalia being loaded into the automobile. 
Officer Caldwell stated that appellant and Leonard allegedly hid 
the equipment in the back of the truck, that they did not own the 
truck in which they were transporting the equipment and that they 
did not give their names when they purchased the equipment. 
These reasons were the basis for the officers' alleged probable 
cause for stopping the vehicle and seizing the equipment. 
In accordance with the above-cited cases, such action did 
not show intent on appellant's part making said possession a 
crime under U.C.A. Section 58-37a-3. Said equipment is of such a 
nature that any person would probably transport it in the rear 
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part of a vehicle. This is not a rational reason for suspicion 
or reasonable belief of illicit activity. Further, it is not 
common practice for individuals to leave th€*ir names when they 
purchase such equipment. And it is common for someone to drive a 
vehicle owned by another person. Thus, these facts do not 
provide a basis for a reasonable inference of criminal intent, as 
required by statute. 
III. THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE OF EVIDENCE FROM APPELLANT'S 
RESIDENCE WAS UNREASONABLE AND, THEREFORE, 
VIOLATIVE OF APPELLANT'S FOURTH AMENDMENT 
RIGHTS, AS WELL AS APPELLANT'S FUNDAMENTAL 
RIGHT TO PRIVACY GUARANTEED BY THE NINTH AMENDMENT. 
"The Fourth Amendment guarantees to each citizen the right 
of privacy in his affairs and in his possessions, and 
unauthorized intrusion into an area wherein privacy would 
normally be expected constitutes an illegal search." State v. 
Johnson, 530 P.2d 910 (Ariz, App. 1975); See also, People v. 
Medina. 496 P.2d 433 (Cal. 1972). Because the circumstances 
surrounding the purchase of the subject equipment were not 
extraordinary or suspicious, the alleged evidence submitted to 
procure the warrant did not provide the probable cause required 
for the proper issuance of a search warrant. Consequently, the 
subsequent search of appellant's residence was unreasonable and 
the evidence obtained therefrom it tainted as fruit of the 
poisonous tree. Terry v. Ohio, supra. 
In In Interest of I., R.L.. 739 P.2d 1123 (Utah App. 1987), 
the Supreme Court of Utah held that the purpose of constitutional 
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provisions against unreasonable searches and seizures is to 
protect personal privacy and dignity against unwarranted 
intrusion by the State. Furthermore, the fourth amendment 
protects citizens against unreasonable government searches which 
intrude upon a person's reasonable expectations of privacy. See, 
State v. Crawford, 716 P.2d 1349 (Id. App. 1986). 
In the instant case, appellant certainly had a legitimate 
expectation of privacy and control over her property and her 
residence. A person has a right to exclude unwanted and 
unwarranted intrusions of his/her property, especially with 
regard to his/her home. See, State v. Dixon, 740 P.2d 1224 (Or. 
App. 1987). In addition, "a police officer's belief is 
irrelevant to the question of the defendant's expectation of 
privacy." State v. DeAlo, 748 P.2d 194 (Utah App. 1987). Thus, 
in this case, the police officers' beliefs should have been 
subordinated to appellant's right to privacy and safety from 
unreasonable searches and seizures.3 
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
protects citizens against unreasonable government searches which 
intrude upon a person's reasonable expectations of privacy. Here 
3
 In Zinn v. State, 656 P.2d 1206 (Alaska App. 1982), the 
court stated: 
Of those several areas in which an individual's privacy 
receives protection by the Fourth Amendment, in none is 
the zone of privacy more clearly defined than when 
bounded by the unambiguous physical dimensions of an 
individual's home; physical entry of a home is the 
chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth 
Amendment is directed. 
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appellant had a reasonable expectation of privacy, which barred 
the State from an unreasonable search of appellant's residence. 
Unfortunately, appellant's constitutional rights were ignored and 
trampled under the guise of government enforcement. These basic 
constitutional freedoms upon which our country was founded should 
be extended to appellant. Thereby excluding any evidence 
obtained therefrom. 
IV. THE PRESENTENCE REPORT UNFAIRLY PREJUDICED APPELLANT 
BT MAKING ASSERTIONS THAT WERE UNFOUNDED AND 
NOT SUBJECT TO PROOF. 
The presentence report asserted a statement from a police 
officer that the appellant has manufactured and sold 
methamphetamine drugs in the past. This statement is false and 
not subject to proof. Therefore, it should not have been 
considered by the court in sentencing appellant. Said statement 
was not subject to rebuttal or proof because appellant agreed to 
a plea arrangement with the State prior to trial. 
Thus, said statement was prejudicial to appellant not only 
because of its negative assertionf but also because appellant was 
not afforded an opportunity to rebut said statement. 
Consequentlyf appellant's due process right as incorporated under 




In accordance with the foregoing, appellant respectfully 
requests that the district court's denial of appellant's motion 
to suppress evidence unlawfully obtained by searches of said 
automobile and appellant's residence be overruled, because said 
evidence is tainted as fruit of the poisonous tree. 
DATED this '00 day of __MMMM^r 1990. 
/] r 
Dean N. Za 
Attorney for Appellant 
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